Hands attached to reform opportunities: to come to cope with the Hungary problem of the EU

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The relationship between Hungary and the European Union has seen the climbing tensions In the past fifteen years. Given that Viktor Orbán obtained his parliamentary supermajority in 2010, Hungary has increasingly disputed the fundamental principles of the EU. In 2018, the European Parliament sparked article 7, paragraph 1, against Hungary and Poland, citing serious concerns concerning the rule of law. Informally, “the nuclear option”, article 7 (1) allows the council to suspend the voting rights of a member if it is found that they repeatedly break the EU values. Despite the importance of this decision, the process quickly stopped due to the need for an almost unanimity agreement between the Member States, which enabled Hungary and Poland to provide reciprocal assistance.

In response to this dead end, the EU moved to financial pressure. Since 2022, About 32 billion euros in EU funds for Hungary were frozen. Under the new Regulation of the common provisions (EU) 2021/1060, which included an explicit cause connecting the accessions of funds to the compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 22 billion euros in cohesion funds were suspended. In addition, around 10 billion euros in loans and subsidies from the recovery and resilience installation is still not available. However, although the financial lever effect has increased tensions, it has produced limited progress on conformity. On the contrary, Hungary has repeatedly used its veto power to change the decisions of the council. In particular, at the beginning of 2024, Hungary threatened to block 50 billion euros in assistance to Ukraine, which prompted the EU to release 10 billion euros in frozen funds to avoid a crisis.

Today, the issues are higher. The EU prepares its 17th set of sanctions against Russia and negotiates support subsequently in Ukraine, in parallel with opening discussions for the financial framework Mulannal 2028-2034 (MFF). Hungary should take advantage of its veto to oppose the interests of the EU in Ukraine and demand the release of frozen funds. The question of how to manage the difficulties of Hungary has become to the point as geopolitical unity becomes more important than ever. Discussions on the activation fully of article 7 (1) are gaining momentumsuggesting that Brussels could prepare to act more decisively to protect the integrity of the union.

The context: the democratic decline of Hungary and the armament of the veto

The justification of the EU to invoke the application of article 7 (1) stems from two main behaviors that Hungary has systematic armament of his veto within the Council and Son Expand the divergence of basic democratic values ​​of the Union.

First, Hungary systematically used unanimity requirement for sensitive issues – such as foreign policy, EU finances, justice and social security – to obstruct collective decision -making. Although a qualified majority is sufficient for most EU issues, unanimity remains compulsory in these areas. Between 2016 and 2022, Hungary has represented 60% of all vetos in foreign policy Emitted in the union, an surprisingly high number for a single Member State. In particular, Hungary blocked the adoption of the EU’s budget and EU collection fund in 2020, the World City Global Company Tax of 15% in 2022, and has repeatedly delayed financial aid and EU membership talks for Ukraine. More recently, in February 2024, he threatened to stop a help package of 50 billion euros in Ukraine. This forced the EU to release 10 billion euros in previously frozen funds. Hungary has also constantly tried to weaken or delay sanctions against Russia, and it is likely to do the same with the next pack of sanctions.

Second, Hungary’s support for the fundamental EU values ​​was considerably eroded. Freedom House is currently evaluating Hungary at 65 out of 100which is the lowest score in EU countries. Concerns about the decrease in human rights have increased among people in Hungary and governments of the euro zone, in particular for the LGBTQ +community. The law of 2020 which removed legal recognition from transgender persons and the law of 2021 which made illegal to show homosexuality to minors were both widely criticized. The last blow came recently, with a new law, which makes people more difficult for people to come together, effectively making the steps of illegal pride.

Press freedom has also deteriorated. Journalists are increasingly difficult to keep people responsible for responsible, which raises concerns about the decline of the rule of law. The “law on the protection of the sovereign” of 2024 also allows the government to spy on people and groups which are considered to be “undermining the sovereignty of Hungary”. The consequence is an increase in fear of political repression. Judicial independence is still threatened, which weakens checks and counterweights in the Hungarian state.

Hungary’s foreign policy diverge more and more that of the EU. The participation of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in 2024 “Peace Mission” Alongside the Russian and Chinese leaders, without the EU’s mandate, has other relations. Finally, Hungary Removal of the International Criminal Court In April 2025, a symbolic stage of the shared commitments underlined the EU marked.

Hungary actions in the country and abroad are increasingly considered a threat to the credibility and the unity of the EU, and not only as a Hungarian problem.

What now? Roads to come to deal with the EU Hungary problem

The current situation allows three possible ways for the European Union to choose. The first option is to preserve the status quo while pursuing a policy that applies financial pressure and increases the isolation of Hungary within the union. Financial tools (such as Funds freeze within the framework of the RCR, the RRF and the MFF lever effect) were effective in applying short -term pressure. In addition, Hungary has become more and more dependent on the EU funds. In 2016, the allocated EU funds represented 2% of the country’s GDP; In 2024, the number had increased to 12%. It is possible that, in particular due to the internal political pressure, Hungary soon or later submits to the requests of the EU. However, the previous episodes have shown the unpredictability of the Government of President Orbán and its ability to extract concessions by the veto of threats, as in the case of helping Ukraine in 2024. If this dynamic of credibility “of money for nothing” persists without visible value in a significant value in geopolitics. The fear is that the financial pressure can lead to the exacerbation of political tensions without ensuring the deep reforms that the union wants to see.

A second option is to fully trigger article 7, paragraph 1, and to suspend Hungary voting rights. This option would officially imply the Declaration of Hungary as a violation of article 2 EVP; In this case, the voting rights to the Council would be suspended, but the real trigger requires unanimity without Hungary, which the country has always managed to avoid. With Poland’s political change in 2023, Who saw the new government led by Donald Tusk Reposition Poland firmly in the pro-EU camp, Hungary has lost its historic coverage. However, with the Election of Robert Fico in SlovakiaA new potential ally has emerged. The FICO has historically expressed Eurosceptic opinions and has criticized the actions of the EU perceived as unsuccessful to national sovereignty. Slovakia on Fico could now play a role similar to the former Poland – thus protecting Hungary by voting against the last stages of article 7 (1). Although the use of “the nuclear option” is symbolically powerful and sends a strong signal to other European countries on the Union’s commitment to its financing values, it does not present itself without risk of the counterpoup. In fact, it could strengthen the east-west divisions within the Union, and it risks even more Hungary Antagoniser.

The third most drastic option would be to expel Hungary from the European Union. Currently, no legal mechanism exists under the treaties of the EU to expel a Member State unilaterally. Article 50 allows countries to leave the union voluntarilyAs, for example, occurred with the United Kingdom during Brexit. Since Hungary always benefits from inclusion in the EU, a voluntary withdrawal seems unrealistic. A possible warning would be that all the other Member States leave the union and form a new EU with 26 countries (all current members less in Hungary). However, this option is extremely difficult to maintain, because it would require an incredible amount of confidence that the 26 members follow, and even then, the amount of uncertainty it would create the procedure practically impossible. The option also contains a dark future to resolve the Hungary problem. Expelling the country would most likely push further towards the sphere of influence of Russia, creating an even larger pro-Putine consensus in the heart of Europe. If this should happen, it would weaken Europe instead of strengthening it. In addition, even if it is considerably weakened, Hungary remains a democracy and, as such, it retains potential to form an opposition which could, in the future, realign the country in the EU values, as has happened with Poland. Given these factors, it is highly unlikely that the expulsion option is considered a viable line of driving.

A realistic alternative which could break the taxation imposed by the non-cooperation of Hungary without having to fully activate article 7 (1) would be that of increasingly in Article 20. This clause allows groups of 9 or more countries to voluntarily train improved cooperation and work together on specific areas. Its effect would be that of generating a Europe which moves to different speeds and towards different objectives, effectively giving birth to a new “nucleus” and creating parallel institutions within the Union. Promoting increased cooperation could give the most constructive results in the treatment of the Hungary problem. It would neutralize the right of veto without using coercive measures, which could create more instability, and it would recognize a reality which has been slow to surface: which cannot be resolved by unanimity can still be reached by the unit of goal.

Questions:

• Should the European Union work on a transition from a unanimous voting system to a qualified majority on all questions and how could it be achieved?
• Could improved cooperation be the future of business for Brussels and what would it look like in practice?
• A Europe that moves at different speeds would comply with the EU values ​​of equality and development cohesion?

Suggested readings:

• Scheppele, KL and Morijn, J. (2024). Money for nothing? The unequal file of EU EUs’ EUs institutions to apply the EU values. Journal of European Public Policy,, 32(2), 474–497
• Böttner, R. (2022). The instrument of improved cooperation: traps and possibilities of differentiated integration. European papersFlight. 7, n ° 3, pp. 1145-1164
• Dessewffy, T. (2025). Place the Hungarian knot: why the EU could stop spoiling the spoiler state. The European Council on foreign relations

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